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This Article describes the modern paradox of religious rights -- the sudden 
awakening of religion and religious freedom around the globe versus the tragic 
escalation of religious rights abuses born of local bigotry and creedal clashes. This 
paradox lies in part in competing understandings of the rights and rites of conversion 
and the role that local political communities can play in preventing or facilitating the 
same. Some communities regard the right to change one's religion as an essential 
principle of religious freedom that the state must protect. Others regard it as a 
calculated insult to the rights of the religious community whose interests the state must 
support. The paradox also lies in part in competing understandings of the rights and 
wrongs of proselytism - particularly the clash between one party's claims to free 
exercise rights to share the faith versus another party's rights to freedom of conscience 
and religious self-determination. This Article suggests measures drawn from the 
Western story of religious rights to mitigate the problem of conversion and to soften the 
tensions between the religious rights of individuals and groups. This Article further 
argues that while peaceable proselytism is protected by international human rights law, 
resolving the modern problem of proselytism will require more self-restraint from 
proselytizers than legal limitations from government. 
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conscience, freedom of expression, freedom of speech, baptism, conversion, religious 
self-determination, soul wars,  
 
 
1 This chapter represents work in progress on a monograph tentatively entitled, Religion and Human 
Rights: Foundations and Frontiers.  It draws in part on John Witte, Jr., “A Dickensian Era of Religious 
Rights,” William and Mary Law Review 42 (2001): 707-770; id., “A Primer on the Rights and Wrongs of 





A “Dickensian Era” of Religion and Human Rights  
 
“It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it 
was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it 
was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was 
the winter of despair.”2  Charles Dickens penned these famous words to describe the 
paradoxes of the late eighteenth-century French Revolution fought for the sake of “the 
rights of man and citizen.” 3  These same words aptly describe the paradoxes of the 
world revolution fought two centuries later in the name of human rights and 
democratization for all. 
The world has entered something of a “Dickensian era”4 in the past three 
decades.  We have seen the best of human rights protections inscribed on the books, 
but some of the worst of human rights violations inflicted on the ground.  We have 
celebrated the creation of more than thirty new constitutional democracies since 1980, 
but lamented the eruption of more than thirty new civil wars.  We have witnessed the 
wisest of democratic statecraft and the most foolish of autocratic belligerence.  For 
every South African spring of hope, there has been a Yugoslavian winter of despair, for 
every Ukrainian season of light, a Sudanese season of darkness.  
These Dickensian paradoxes of the modern human rights revolution are 
particularly striking when viewed in their religious dimensions.  On the one hand, the 
modern human rights revolution has helped to catalyze a great awakening of religion 
around the globe.  In regions newly committed to democracy and human rights, ancient 
faiths once driven underground by autocratic oppressors, have sprung forth with new 
vigor.  In the former Soviet bloc, for example, numerous Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, 
Jewish, Muslim, and other faiths have been awakened, alongside a host of exotic 
goddess, naturalist, and personality cults.5  In post-colonial and post-revolutionary 
Africa, these same mainline religious groups have come to flourish in numerous 
conventional and inculturated forms, alongside a bewildering array of Traditional 
groups.6  In Latin America, the human rights revolution has not only transformed long-
 
2  Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities (London: Chapman & Hall, 1859), 1. 
3  “Declaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen,” in Léon Duguit, Les Constitutions et Les Principales 
Lois Politiques de la France Depuis 1789 (Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1952), 
1. 
4  The phrase is from Irwin Cotler, “Jewish NGOs and Religious Human Rights: A Case Study,” in Human 
Rights in Judaism: Cultural, Religious, and Political Perspectives, ed. Michael J. Broyde and John Witte, 
Jr. (Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson, 1998), 165. 
5  See John Witte, Jr. and Michael Bourdeaux, eds., Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia: The New War 
for Souls (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1999); Zoe Knox, Russian Society and the Orthodox Church: 
Religion in Russia after Communism (New York: Routledge, 2005).    
6  Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im and Francis M. Deng, eds., Human Rights in Africa: Cross-Cultural 
Perspectives (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1990); Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, ed., 




standing Catholic and mainline Protestant communities but also triggered the explosion 
of numerous new Evangelical, Pentecostal, and Traditional movements.7  Many parts of 
the world have seen the prodigious rise of a host of new or newly minted faiths -- 
Adventists, Bahi'as, Hare Krishnas, Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormons, Scientologists, 
Unification Church members, among many others -- some wielding ample material, 
political, and media power.  Religion today has become, in Susanne Rudolph’s apt 
phrase, the latest “transnational variable.”8  Religious pluralism has become the latest 
local reality for all but the most insular communities.  
One cause and consequence of this great awakening of religion around the globe 
is that the ambit of religious rights has been substantially expanded. In the past three 
decades, more than 200 major new statutes and constitutional provisions on religious 
rights have been promulgated—many replete with generous protections for liberty of 
conscience and freedom of religious exercise, guarantees of religious pluralism, 
equality, and nondiscrimination, and several other special protections and entitlements 
for religious individuals and religious groups.9  These national guarantees have been 
matched with a growing body of regional and international norms, notably the 1981 UN 
Declaration on Religious Intolerance and Discrimination Based Upon Religion and 
Belief, the 1992 UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, and the long catalogue of religious-group 
rights set out in the 1989 Vienna Concluding Document and its progeny.10 
On the other hand, this very same world human rights revolution has helped to 
catalyze new forms of religious and ethnic conflict, oppression, and belligerence that 
have sometimes reached tragic proportions. In the former Yugoslavia and Chechnya, 
for example, local religious and ethnic rivals, previously kept at bay by a common 
oppressor, have converted their new liberties into new licenses to renew their ancient 
 
Symposium: “The Problem of Proselytism in Southern Africa,” Emory International Law Review 14 (2000): 
491-1303. 
7  Paul E. Sigmund, ed., Religious Freedom and Evangelization in Latin America: The Challenge of 
Religious Pluralism (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1999). 
8  Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, “Introduction,” to Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and James Piscatori, eds., 
Transnational Religion and Fading States (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 6.  
9 See analysis in Natan Lerner, Religion, Secular Beliefs, and Human Rights: 25 Years After the 
Declaration (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2006), with sample documents collected in Ian Brownlie and 
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, ed., Basic Documents on Human Rights, 5th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006) and in Tad Stahnke and J. Paul Martin, eds., Religion and Human Rights: Basic Documents (New 
York: Center for the Study of Human Rights, Columbia University, 1998). 
10 Tore Lindholm, W. Cole Durham, Jr., and Bahia G Tahzib-Lie, Facilitating Freedom of Religion or 
Belief: A Deskbook (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2004); Malcolm D. Evans, Religious Liberty and 
International Law in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Bahia G. Tahzib, Freedom 
of Religion or Belief: Ensuring Effective International Legal Protection (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1996); Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective, ed. John Witte, Jr. and Johan D. van der Vyver, 2 




hostilities, with catastrophic results.11 In Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, and the Central 
African Republic, ethnic nationalism and religious extremism have conspired to bring 
violent dislocation or death to hundreds of rival religious believers each year, and 
persecution, false imprisonment, forced starvation, and savage abuses to thousands of 
others.12  In France, Belgium, Germany, and Austria, political secularism, laicization, and 
nationalism have combined to threaten civil denial and deprivation to a number of 
believers, particularly “sects” and “cults” of high religious temperature or of low cultural 
conformity.  In the United States, political messianism and Evangelical fundamentalism 
have together embraced a “clash-of-civilizations” ethic that has encouraged bigotry 
against minorities at home and belligerence against the “axis of evil” abroad.  In several 
communities from Asia to the Middle East, Christian, Jewish, and Muslim minorities 
have faced sharply increased restrictions, repression, and more than occasional 
martyrdom.13  And, in many parts of the world today, barbaric Islamicist terrorists have 
waged a destructive jihad against all manner of religious, cultural, and ethnic enemies, 
real and imagined. 
In parts of Russia, Eastern Europe, Africa, and Latin America, this human rights 
revolution has brought on something of a new war for souls between indigenous and 
foreign religious groups.  This is the most recent, and the most ironic, chapter in the 
modern Dickensian drama.  With the political transformations of these regions in the 
past two decades, foreign religious groups were granted rights to enter these regions for 
the first time in decades.  Beginning in the early 1990s, they came in increasing 
numbers to preach their faiths, to offer their services, to convert new souls.  Initially, 
local religious groups -- Orthodox, Catholic, Protestant, Sunni, Shi’ite, and Traditional 
alike -- welcomed these foreigners, particularly their foreign co-religionists with whom 
they had lost contact for many decades.  Today, local religious groups have come to 
resent these foreign religions, particularly those from North America and Western 
Europe who assume a democratic human rights ethic.  Local religious groups resent the 
participation in the marketplace of religious ideas that democracy assumes.  They 
resent the toxic waves of materialism and individualism that democracy inflicts.  They 
resent the massive expansion of religious pluralism that democracy encourages.  They 
resent the extravagant forms of religious speech, press, and assembly that democracy 
protects.14 
 
11Julie A. Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1999); Paul Mojzes, Yugoslavian Inferno: Ethnoreligious Warfare in the Balkans (New York: Continuum, 
1995); Michael A. Sells, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia (Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 1996). 
12 Francis M. Deng, War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan (Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution, 1995), 9-31. 
13T. Jeremy Gunn, Dieu en France et aux États-Unis: Quand les mythes font la loi (Paris: Berg 
International, 2005); T. Jeremy Gunn, “Religious Freedom and Laïcité: A Comparison of the United States 
and France,” Brigham Young University Law Review (2004): 419-506. 
14  Symposium: “Pluralism, Proselytism and Nationalism in Eastern Europe,” Journal of Ecumenical 




A new war for souls has thus broken out in these regions, a war to reclaim the 
traditional cultural and moral souls of these new societies, and a war to retain 
adherence and adherents to indigenous faiths.  In part, this is a theological war, as rival 
religious communities have begun to demonize and defame each other and to gather 
themselves into ever more dogmatic and fundamentalist stands. The ecumenical spirit 
of the previous decades is giving way to sharp new forms of religious balkanization. In 
part, this is a legal war, as local religious groups have begun to conspire with their 
political leaders to adopt statutes and regulations restricting the constitutional rights of 
their foreign religious rivals. Beneath shiny constitutional veneers of religious freedom 
for all and unqualified ratification of international human rights instruments, several 
countries of late passed firm new anti-proselytism laws, cult registration requirements, 
tightened visa controls, and various other discriminatory restrictions on new or newly 
arrived religions.  Indeed, several parts of the non-Western world seem to be on a new 
dawn of fundamentalist Islamic and Christian religious establishments.15 
While some non-Western nations seem poised to reestablish old forms of 
religion, some Western nations seem ready to establish new forms of secularism.  In the 
1990s, France, Germany, Belgium, and Austria passed firm new anti-cult legislation that 
targeted a large number of new and traditional religious groups with a tone approaching 
xenophobia.16  In more recent years, France, Belgium, and Turkey have begun to press 
aggressive new state policies of “laicization” and “secularization” that have resulted in 
growing restrictions on minority religious schools, charities, and sanctuaries, and 
stronger policing of culturally different or deviant behavior.17  The recent sensational 
Muslim headscarf cases in France and Turkey are only one illustration of bigger issues 
that culturally-different religious minorities are now facing in many parts of Western 
Europe as well as in Canada and other Commonwealth countries.  The 2004 judgment 
of the European Court of Human Rights against the Turkish Muslim woman who sought 
religious freedom to wear her headdress in a public university has only encouraged 
 
15 See examples in Gabriel A. Almond, R. Scott Appleby, and Emmanuel Sivian, Strong Religion: The 
Rise of Fundamentalism Around the World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003); Abdullahi 
Ahmed An-Na’im, African Constitutionalism and the Contingent Role of Islam (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2006); W. Cole Durham, Jr. and Silvio Ferrari, eds., Laws on Religion and the State 
in Post-Communist Europe (Leuven: Peeters, 2004). 
16 The most comprehensive is the Endbericht der Enquete-Kommission Sogennante Sekten und 
Psychogruppen, Deutscher Bundestag 13. Wahlperiode Drucksche 13/10950 (June 6, 1998).  See New 
Religions in Global Perspective: A Study of Religious Change in the Modern World, ed. Peter B. Clarke 
(New York: Routledge, 2006); Elisabeth Arweck and Peter B. Clarke, New Religious Movements in 
Western Europe: An Annotated Bibliography (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997); International 
Perspectives on Freedom and Equality of Religious Beliefs, ed. Derek H. Davis and Gerhard Besier 
(Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2002). 
17 See analysis in Symposium, “The Frontiers of Religious Liberty: A Comparative Law Celebration of the 
25th Anniversary of the 1981 UN Declaration on Religious Intolerance,” Emory International Law Review 




Nation-States to tighten their restrictions on religious and cultural minorities as part of a 
broader effort to create national solidarity on secular grounds.18   
Variants on some of these same patterns are beginning to emerge in the United 
States as well.  Using the vaunted principle of “separation of church and state,” several 
recent federal courts have struck down public displays and expressions of religion as 
violations of the First Amendment establishment clause.  This has renewed concerns 
among some commentators that American courts have embarked on a new campaign 
to privatize religion and to “establish a religion of secularism.”19  At the same time, the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s dramatic weakening of the First Amendment free exercise clause 
in the case of Employment Division v. Smith (1990) has left religious and cultural 
minorities highly vulnerable to local prejudice.20  To be sure, the United States Congress 
and various state legislatures have stepped into this breach by passing a number of 
special statutory protections for religious minorities.21  But several federal agencies, 
notably the IRS and INS, have not dealt kindly with religious and cultural groups who 
have proved critical of mainline religions or majoritarian politics, or aggressive in their 
attempts to expand their unpopular faith.   
Hence the modern problem of proselytism: How does the state balance one 
person’s right to exercise his or her faith versus another person's right to liberty of 
conscience, one group’s right to religious expression and another group’s right to 
religious self-determination?  How does the state protect the juxtaposed rights claims of 
majority and minority religions, or of foreign and indigenous religions?  How does the 
state balance its need to create national solidarity and peace with its duty to respect 
minority cultures and their need to dissent?  How does the state craft a general rule to 
govern multiple theological understandings of conversion or change of religion?  These 
are not new questions.  They confronted the drafters of the international bill of rights 
 
18 Re Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44744/98 (Eur. Ct. H. R. June 29, 2004), available at 
http.://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Judgments.htm.  See analysis of this and related cases in Lerner, Religion, 
Secular Beliefs, and Human Rights, 181-200; Natan Lerner, Group Rights and Discrimination in 
International Law, 2d ed. (The Hague/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2003).  For comparative analysis of recent 
limitations and restrictions on religious freedom in Europe, see Symposium, “The Permissible Scope of 
Legal Limitations on Freedom of Religion and Belief,” Emory International Law Review (2005): 465-1320. 
19 The phrase was made popular in a dissenting opinion by Justice Potter Stewart in Abington School 
District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 313 (Stewart, J., dissenting).  See further John Witte, Jr., “Facts and 
Fictions About the History of Separation of Church and State,” Journal of Church and State 48 (2006): 15-
46.  A telling recent example is Faith Center Church v. Glover, __ F. 3d. __ (9th Circ., 2006), which denied 
the right of a religious group to public worship in a public library open to other groups with arguments that 
the “separation of church and state ... serves the salutary purpose of protecting civil society from the 
excesses of the zealous”  that can only lead to “alienation and social unrest.”  Ibid., __ (Karlton, J. 
concurring). 
20 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  
21 See analysis of recent statutory protections of religious freedom in “to be published”, New York Times 
(2006): __ and broader patterns in John Witte, Jr., Religion and the American Constitutional Experiment, 




from the very beginning.  But some of the compromises of 1948 and 1966 have today 
begun to betray their limitations.  
 
The Problem of Conversion 
 
One side of the modern problem of proselytism is the problem of competing 
theological and legal understandings of conversion or change of religion.22  How does a 
state craft a legal rule that at once respects and protects the sharply competing 
understandings of conversion among the religions of the Book.  Most Western 
Christians have easy conversion into and out of the faith.  Most Jews have difficult 
conversion into and out of the faith.  Most Muslims have easy conversion into the faith, 
but allow for no conversion out of it, at least for prominent members: indeed, to convert 
out of Islam is a capital crime.23  Whose rites get rights?  Moreover, how does one craft 
a legal rule that respects Orthodox, Hindu, Jewish, or Traditional groups that tie 
religious identity not to voluntary choice, but to birth and caste, blood and soil, language 
and ethnicity, sites and sights of divinity?   
On the issue of conversion or change of religion, the major international human 
rights instruments largely accept the religious voluntarism common among libertarian 
and Western Christian groups.  The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
included an unequivocal guarantee: "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience, and religion; this right includes the right to change his religion or belief...." 
(Art. 18.1). The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, whose 
preparation was more highly contested on this issue, became a bit more tentative: "This 
right shall include freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of his choice...." (Art. 
18.1)  The 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief repeated this same more tentative language.  
But the dispute over the right to conversion contributed greatly to the long delay in the 
production of this instrument, and to the number of dissenters to it.  The 1989 Vienna 
Concluding Document did not touch the issue at all, but simply confirmed "the freedom 
of the individual to profess or practice religion or belief" before turning to a robust 
rendition of religious group rights.    
Today, this issue over the right to convert has become more divisive than ever as 
various soul wars have broken out, especially between and within Christian and Muslim 
 
22 See Lerner, Religion, Secular Beliefs, and Human Rights, 119-168; J.A. Walkate, “The Right of 
Everyone to Change his Religion or Belief,” Netherlands International Law Review 2 (1983): 146. 
23 Joel A. Nichols, “Mission, Evangelism, and Proselytism in Christianity: Mainline Conceptions as 
Reflected in Church Documents,” Emory International Law Review 12 (1998): 563-656; David Novak, 
“Proselytism and Conversion in Judaism,” in Sharing the Book: Religious Perspectives on the Rights and 
Wrongs of Proselytism, ed. John Witte, Jr. and Richard C. Martin (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1999), 17-
44; Donna E. Arzt, “The Treatment of Religious Dissidents under Classic and Contemporary Islamic Law,” 




communities around the globe. These tensions have been exacerbated by the U.S.-led 
wars on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Some hardline Christian and Muslim 
fundamentalists have cast these wars as “crusades” not to end terror but to conquer 
Islamic cultures and convert Muslim souls.  This image has only been encouraged by 
the sensational media case surrounding the Christian conversion of an Afghani man, 
Abdul Rahman, in the spring of 2006.   Rahman had converted from Islam to 
Christianity and was seeking to gain custody of his two daughters.  His wife’s family 
counterclaimed that he was unfit to gain custody because of his crime of conversion.  
Following the 2004 Constitution, which declares the supremacy of Islamic law, an 
Afghani court not only denied Rahman custody of his daughters, but sentenced him to 
death for his crime of conversion contrary to Islamic law.  Mr. Rahman was able to 
escape death only because of the intense media exposure of his case and diplomatic 
intervention at the highest levels.  But he had to leave his daughters in Afghanistan and 
seek asylum in Italy.24  Other converts to Christianity from Islam have not fared nearly 
so well, human rights watch groups regularly report.  
"A page of history is worth a volume of logic," Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once 
said.25  And, on an intractable legal issue such as this, recollection might more 
illuminating than ratiocination.  It is discomfiting, but enlightening, for Western Christians 
to remember that the right to enter and exit the religion of one's choice was born in the 
West only after centuries of cruel experience.  To be sure, a number of the early Church 
Fathers considered the right to change religion as essential to the notion of liberty of 
conscience, and such sentiments have been repeated and glossed continuously over 
the centuries.26  But in practice the Christian Church largely ignored these sentiments 
for centuries.  As the medieval Catholic Church refined its rights structures in the twelfth 
and thirteenth centuries, it also routinized its religious discrimination, reserving its 
harshest sanctions for heretics.  The communicant faithful enjoyed full rights.  Jews and 
Muslims enjoyed fewer rights, but full rights if they converted to Christianity.  Heretics -- 
those who voluntarily chose to leave the faith -- enjoyed still fewer rights, and had little 
opportunity to recover them even after full confession.  Indeed, at the height of the 
inquisition in the fifteenth century, heretics faced not only severe restrictions on their 
persons, properties, and professions, but sometimes unspeakably cruel forms of torture 
and punishment.  Similarly, as the Lutheran, Calvinist, and Anglican Churches born of 
the Protestant Reformation routinized their establishments in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, they inflicted all manner of repressive civil and ecclesiastical 
censures on those who chose to deviate from established doctrine -- savage torture and 
execution in a number of instances.27   
 
24 See report in “Kabul Judge Rejects Calls to End Trial of Christian Convert,” New York Times (Mar. 24, 
2006), A3; “Italy Grants Asylum to Afghan Christian Convert,” New York Times (Mar. 30, 2006), A14. 
25 New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921). 
26 Brian Tierney, "Religious Rights: An Historical Perspective,” in Religious Human Rights, 1:17-46. 
27 Perez Zagorin, How the Idea of Religious Toleration Came to the West (Princeton: Princeton University 




It was, in part, the recovery and elaboration of earlier patristic concepts of liberty 
of conscience as well as the slow expansion of new Protestant and Catholic theologies 
of religious voluntarism that helped to end this practice.  But, it was also the new 
possibilities created by the frontier and by the colony that helped to forge the Western 
understanding of the right to change religion.  Rather than stay at home and fight for 
one's faith, it became easier for the dissenter to move away quietly to the frontier, or 
later to the colony, to be alone with his conscience and his co-religionists.  Rather than 
tie the heretic to the rack or the stake, it became easier for the establishment to banish 
him quickly from the community with a strict order not to return.  Such pragmatic 
tempering of the treatment of heretics and dissenters eventually found theological 
justification.  By the later sixteenth century, it became common in the West to read of 
the right, and the duty, of the religious dissenter to emigrate physically from the 
community whose faith he or she no longer shared.28  In the course of the next century, 
this right of physical emigration from a religious community was slowly transformed into 
a general right of voluntary exit from a religious faith and community.  Particularly 
American writers, many of whom had voluntarily left their Europeans faiths and 
territories to gain their freedom, embraced the right to leave -- to change their faith, to 
abandon their blood, soil and confession, to reestablish their lives, beliefs, and identities 
afresh -- as a veritable sine qua non of religious freedom.29  This understanding of the 
right to choose and change religion -- patristic, pragmatic, and Protestant in initial 
inspiration -- has now become an almost universal feature of Western Christian 
understandings of religious rights.  
To tell this peculiar Western tale is not to resolve current legal conflicts over 
conversion.  But it is to suggest that even hard and hardened religious traditions can 
and do change over time, in part out of pragmatism, in part out of fresh appeals to 
ancient principles long forgotten.  Even those schools of jurisprudence within Shi'ite and 
Sunni communities that have been the sternest in their opposition to a right to 
conversion from the faith, do have resources in the Qur'an, in the early development of 
Shari'a, and in the more benign policies of other contemporary Muslim communities, to 
rethink their theological positions.30   
Moreover, the Western story suggests that there are half-way measures, at least 
in banishment and emigration, that help to blunt the worst tensions between a religious 
group's right to maintain its standards of entrance and exit and an individual's liberty of 
 
Press, 1995); Religious Liberty in Western Thought, ed. Noel B. Reynolds and W. Cole Durham, Jr. 
(Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1996). 
28 The most famous formulation of the right, and duty, of the dissenter to emigrate peaceably from the 
territory whose religious establishment he or she cannot abide, comes in the Peace of Augsburg (1555), 
and its provisions are repeated in the Edict of Nantes (1598) and the Religious Peace of Westphalia 
(1648).  See Sidney Z. Ehler and John B. Morrall, eds., Church and State Through the Centuries: A 
Collection of Historical Documents with Commentary (Newman, MD: Burnes & Oates, 1964), 164-198. 
29 Max L. Stackhouse and Deirdre King Hainsworth, “Deciding for God: The Right to Convert in Protestant 
Perspectives,” in Sharing the Book, 201-230.  




conscience to come and go.  Not every heretic needs to be executed.  Not every heretic 
needs to be indulged.  It is one thing for a religious tradition to insist on executing its 
charges of heresy, when a mature adult, fully aware of the consequences of his or her 
choice, voluntarily enters a faith, and then later seeks to leave.  In that case group 
religious rights must trump individual religious rights -- with the limitation that the 
religious group has no right to violate, or to solicit violation of, the life and limb of the 
wayward member.  It is quite another thing for a religious tradition to press the same 
charges of heresy against someone who was born into, married into, or coerced into the 
faith and now, upon opportunity for mature reflection, voluntarily chooses to leave.  In 
that case, individual religious rights trump group religious rights.   
Where a religious group exercises its trump by banishment or shunning and the 
apostate voluntarily chooses to return, he does so at his peril.  He should find little 
protection in state law when subject to harsh religious sanctions -- again, unless the 
religious group threatens or violates his or his family’s life or limb.  Where a religious 
individual exercises her trump by emigration, and the group chooses to pursue her, it 
does so at its peril.  It should find little protection from state law when charged with 
tortious or criminal violations of the individual.  
 
The Problem of Proselytism 
 
The corollary to the problem of conversion is the problem of proselytism –- of the 
efforts taken by individuals or groups to seek the conversion of another.  On this issue 
the international human rights instruments provide somewhat more nuanced direction.   
Article 18 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights protects 
a person’s “freedom, individually or in community with others and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice, and teaching” (Art. 18.1).  
But the same article allows such manifestation of religion to be subject to limitations that 
“are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or 
morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others” (Art. 18.3).  It prohibits 
outright any “coercion” that would impair another’s right “to have or adopt a religion or 
belief of [his or her] choice” (Art. 18.2).  It also requires states and individuals to have 
“respect for the liberty of parents ... to ensure the religious and moral education of their 
children in conformity with [the parents’] convictions” (Art. 18.4).  This latter provision is 
underscored and amplified in more recent instruments and cases on the rights of 
parents and children, most notably the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child.31 
 
31 Convention on the Rights of the Child (November 20, 1989), 28 I.L.M. 1448; Symposium, “What’s 




Similarly, Article 19 of the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights protects 
the “freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless 
of frontiers, either orally, in writing, or in print, in the form of art, or through any other 
media of his choice” (Art. 19.2).   But Article 19, too, allows legal restrictions that are 
necessary for “respect of the rights and reputation of others; for the protection of 
national security or of public order (ordre public) or of public health or morals” (Art. 
19.3).  As a further limitation on the rights of religion and (religious) expression 
guaranteed in Articles 18 and 19, Article 26 of the 1966 Covenant prohibits any state 
discrimination on grounds of religion.  And Article 27 guarantees to religious minorities 
“the right to enjoy their own culture” and “to profess and practise their own religion.”  
These latter guarantees are amplified by the 1992 Declaration on the Rights of Persons 
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious, or Linguistic Minorities.  Distilling the 
international principle of “religious self-determination,” the 1992 Declaration recognizes 
that “the promotion and protection of the rights” of religious minorities is “an integral part 
of the development of a society as a whole and within a democratic framework based 
on the rule of law.”  Accordingly, it calls upon states to respect and to pass 
implementing legislation that protects and promotes the rights of cultural, religious, and 
linguistic minorities “to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, 
and to use their own language, in private and in public, freely and without interference 
or any form of discrimination.”32  
The literal language of the mandatory 1966 Covenant (and its amplification in 
more recent instruments and cases) thus certainly protects the general right to 
proselytize –- understood as the right to “manifest,” “teach,” “express,” and “impart” 
religious ideas for the sake, among other things, of seeking the conversion of another.  
The Covenant provides no protection for coercive proselytism.  At minimum, this bars 
physical or material manipulation of the would-be convert, and in some contexts even 
more subtle forms of deception, enticement, and inducement to convert.  The Covenant 
also casts serious suspicion on any proselytism among children or among adherents to 
minority religions and indigenous cultures.  But, outside of these contexts, the religious 
expression inherent in proselytism is no more suspect than political, economic, artistic, 
or other forms of expression, and should, at minimum, enjoy the same rights protection.  
If Coca Cola can hustle its fizzy sugar water and Hollywood can broadcast its violent 
movies in an area of the world, then religious communities must be able to express their 
religious convictions as well. 
Such rights to religion and religious expression are not absolute.  The 1966 
Covenant and its progeny allow for legal protections of “public safety, order, health, or 
morals,” “national security” and “the rights and reputation of others,” particularly minors 
 
32 Preamble and arts. 1-2, reprinted by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/minorites.htm   See similar protections in the Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples Convention (1989), arts. 3.2, 5(a)-(c), at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/indigenous.htm 
See further Johan D. van der Vyver, Leuven Lectures on Religious Institutions, Religious Communities, 




and minorities.  But all such legal restrictions on religious expression must always be 
imposed without discrimination against any religion in violation of Article 26, and with 
due regard for the general mandates of “necessity and proportionality” -- the rough 
international analogues to the “compelling state interest” and “least restrictive 
alternative” prongs of the strict scrutiny test of American constitutional law.  General 
“time, place, and manner” restrictions on all proselytizers that are necessary, 
proportionate, and applied without discrimination against any religion might thus well be 
apt.  But categorical criminal bans on proselytism, or patently discriminatory licensing or 
registration provisions on proselytizing faiths are prima facie a violation of the religious 
rights of the proselytizer -- as has been clear in the United States since Cantwell v. 
Connecticut (1940)33 and in the European community since Kokkinakis v. Greece 
(1993).34  
To my mind, the preferred solution to the modern problem of proselytism is not 
so much further state restriction as further self-restraint on the part of both local and 
foreign religious groups.  Again, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights provides some useful cues. Article 27 of the Covenant, and its amplification in 
the 1992 Convention on Minorities, reminds us of the special right of local religious 
groups, particularly minorities, “to enjoy their own culture, and to profess and practise 
their own religion.”  Such language might well empower and encourage vulnerable 
minority traditions to seek protection from aggressive and insensitive proselytism by 
missionary mavericks and “drive by” crusaders who have emerged with alacrity in the 
past two decades.  It might even have supported a moratorium on proselytism for a few 
years in places like Russia just after perestroika and glasnost so that local religions, 
even the majority Russian Orthodox Church, had some time to recover from nearly a 
century of harsh oppression that destroyed most of its clergy, seminaries, monasteries, 
literature, and icons.  But Article 27 cannot permanently insulate local religious groups 
from interaction with other religions.  No religious and cultural tradition has the right to 
remain frozen.  For local traditions to seek blanket protections against foreign 
proselytism, even while inevitably interacting with other dimensions of foreign cultures, 
is ultimately a self-defeating policy.  It stands in sharp contrast to cardinal human rights 
principles of openness, development, and choice.  Even more, it belies the very 
meaning of being a religious tradition.  As Jaroslav Pelikan reminds us: “Tradition is the 
living faith of the dead; traditionalism is the dead faith of the living.”35  
Article 19 of the Covenant reminds us further that that the right to expression, 
including religious expression, carries with it “special duties and responsibilities” (Art. 
19.3).   One such duty, it would seem, is to respect the religious dignity and autonomy 
of the other, and to expect the same respect for one’s own dignity and autonomy.  This 
 
33 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).  See analysis in Howard O. Hunter and Polly J. Price, 
“Regulation of Religious Proselytism in the United States,” Brigham Young University Law Review 537 
(2001). 
34 Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260-A Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) 18. 




is the heart of the Golden Rule.  It encourages all parties, especially foreign 
proselytizing groups, to negotiate and adopt voluntary codes of conduct of restraint and 
respect of the other.  This requires not only continued cultivation of interreligious 
dialogue and cooperation -- the happy hallmarks of the modern ecumenical movement 
and of the growing emphasis on comparative religion and globalization in our 
seminaries.  It also requires guidelines of prudence and restraint that every foreign 
mission board would do well to adopt and enforce: Proselytizers would do well to know 
and appreciate the history, culture, and language of the proselytizee; to avoid 
Westernization of the Gospel and First Amendmentization of politics; to deal honestly 
and respectfully with theological and liturgical differences; to respect and advocate the 
religious rights of all peoples; to be Good Samaritans as much as good preachers; to 
proclaim their Gospel both in word and in deed.36  Moratoria on proselytism might 
provide temporary relief; but moderation by proselytizers and proselytizees is the more 
enduring course.  
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